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hearings along with other circumstances which cause the Court to
award custody. Then when custody is determined, the custodian
should normally be left free to decide in what religious faith the child
will be raised. The court's duty would be fulfilled by considering
whether any religious training would be made available to the child
and the importance of a particular kind of religious training in relation
to the other circumstances of the case.
Billy R. Paxton
PLEADING-STATUTE OF LuirrATIONS-RELATION BACK OF AN A mND-
NMNT CHANGING =rn DE NANr-Plaintiff brought an action against
the individual members of the Harlan County Board of Education,
alleging that he was injured by the gross negligence of a truck driver
who was an employee of the board acting within the scope of his
employment.' After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, plaintiff amended
his complaint making the Harlan County Board of Education de-
fendant.2 However, the amendment was made more than one year
after the alleged injury.3 The circuit court dismissed the original
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and dismissed the amended complaint as barred by the statute
of limitations. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Held: Affirmed. Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, 809
S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1958).
County boards of education in Kentucky are quasi municipal
corporations.4  Members of a county board of education are in-
dividually liable for tort injuries resulting (1) from their failure to
perform a specific ministerial act involving no discretion which is
expressly required by statute and (2) from their failure to exercise
ordinary care to employ a person qualified to perform the work for
I The defendants in the original complaint were named as follows:
"James Green, (the truck driver) James Cawood, Supt. Carson
Coleman, Board Member, Paul Graham, Board Member, Caleb Creech,
Board Member, Dr. S. H. Rowland, Board Member, J. S. Hensley
Board Member of the Harlan Educational Board."
Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, 809 S.W. 2d 771 (Ky. 1958).
2 The amended complaint designated the defendants as follows:
"Harlan County Board of Education Consisting of James Cawood,
Supt. and Carson Coleman, Paul Graham, Caleb Creech, Dr. S. H.
Rowland, J. S. Hensley Board Members."
Id. at 771-72.
3 The Statute of Limitations for such actions is one year. Ky. Rev. Stat. sec.
413.140(a) (1956).4
"Each board of education shall be a body politic and corporate with
perpetual succession. It may sue and be sued ... " Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 160.160
(1956). See also, Board of Education of Kenton County v. Talbott, 286 Ky. 543,
549, 151 S.W. 2d 42, 45 (1941).
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which he is hired.5 Although plaintiff's original complaint could con-
ceivably have stated a claim under the second theory, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing the
original complaint for failure to state a claim. On the other hand, it is
well established in Kentucky that a county board of education is not
liable in tort for injuries inflicted while exercising a governmental
function.6 The amended complaint was not dismissed on this ground.
The Court of Appeals stated:
The defendants in the amended complaint differed from those in
the original complaint. The action against the parties named in the
amended complaint was instituted more than one year following the
date of the alleged injury. The Statute of Limitations was a bar to
an action against the parties named in the amended complaint.7
The scope of this comment is limited to the problem of the relation
back of an amendment which changes the defendant from an in-
dividual to a corporation or vice versa.
Rule 15.03 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure states the
principles for determining whether an amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading for the purpose of avoiding the statute
of limitations. The rule provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.8
In interpreting the identical federal rule, the federal district court
in Sanders v. Metzger stated the rule governing amendments which
change the name of the defendant:
If the effect of the proposed amendment is merely to correct
the name of a party already in court, clearly there is no prejudice in
allowing the amendment, even though it relates back to the date of
the original complaint.
On the other hand, if the effect of the amendment is to
substitute for the defendant a new party, such amendment amounts
to a new and independent cause of action and cannot be permitted
when the statute of limitations has run. (citations omitted) 9
Although this rule is easily stated, it is quite often difficult to apply
to particular fact situations. When a plaintiff has sued an individual
5Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W. 2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1951) (dictum); Kirkpatrick's
Adm'x (Bronaugh) v. Murray, 294 Ky. 715, 718, 172 S.W. 2d 591, 593 (1943).
6 Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W. 2d 489, 490 (Ky. 1951); Thacker v. Pike County
Board of Education, 301 Ky. 781, 193 S.W. 2d 409 (1946); Wallace v. Laurel
County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W. 2d 915 (1941).
7 Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, 309 S.W. 2d 771, 772 (Ky.
1958).
8 Ky. R. Civ. P. 15.03 adopts verbatim Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). For the rule
governing the amendment of any summons or proof of process, see Ky. R. Civ. P.
4.16, which is substantially the same as Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
9 66 F. Supp. 262, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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and amends his complaint to make a corporation the defendant (or
vice versa), it is not surprising to find that the Courts have not
reached uniform results.
Prior to the decision in the Gilbert case, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky bad consistently held that an amendment which substituted
an individual or partnership for the corporation named in the original
pleading did not relate back to the date of the original pleading.10
As in the Gilbert case, the Court reasoned that the amendment stated
a new cause of action against parties not previously before the court;
hence, the original pleading did not bar the new defendants from
relying upon the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals dis-
tinguished these cases from those in which the amendment merely
corrected a misnomer in the name of a party already before the court."
Possibly a majority of state courts12 as well as a number of federal
courts'3 have adopted this view.
In many cases, however, a strong argument can be made for the
view that such amendments merely correct a misnomer in the name
of a party already before the court. The plaintiff seeks to sue a par-
ticular business entity, but he may be mistaken as to whether the
business entity is individually owned or incorporated. As the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania pointed out:
The word 'company', when used as part of a name of a
business enterprise reasonably suggests a corporation, and the public
logically assumes, having no notice to the contrary, that it is a corpora-
tion. Where a private individual uses 'company' as a fictitious name,
he may deceive the public whether he intends to do so or not. 14
The business entity approach had led some courts to conclude that
an amendment changing the name of the defendant does relate back
to the date of the original pleading on the theory that the amendment
does no more than correct a mistake in the characterization of the
original defendant, i.e., the business entity.15
10 Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co., 298 Ky. 216, 182 S.W. 2d 657 (1944); Nunn
v. City of Louisville, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1293, 105 S.W. 119 (1907); Geneva Cooper-
age Co. v. Brown, 124 Ky. 16, 98 S.W. 279, 124 Am. St. Rep. 888 (1906);
Leatherman v. Times Co., 88 Ky. 291, 11 S.W. 12, 3 L.R.A. 324, 21 Am. St. Rep.342 (1889).
11 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Imperial Jellico Coal Co. v. Neff, 166
Ky. 722, 179 S.W. 829 (1915), held that an amendment changing the de-
fendant's name from "Imperial Coal Co." to "Imperial Jellico Coal Co." related
back to the date of the original complaint so as to bar the plea of the statute of
limitations.
12 See, annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 6, 166 (1949).
13 E.g., Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
14Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371 Pa. 436, 89 A. 2d 527, 528 (1952).
15Evans v. List, 193 Ark. 13, 97 S.W. 2d 73 (1936); Cabot v. Clearwater
Construction Co., 89 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1956); Waugh v. Steelton Taxicab Co., 371
Pa. 436, 89 A. 2d 527 (1952); annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 6, 171 (1949).
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RECENT CASES
A comparison of two cases from different jurisdictions will illustrate
the justice of the "entity" approach. In Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co.,16
the plaintiff brought an action against the "Harlan Fuel Company, a
corporation" to recover for injuries sustained while in its employ. In
fact, the corporation had been dissolved only three months prior to the
plaintiffs injury, and the business had been carried on by a partner-
ship under the same name. After the one year statute of limitations
had run, the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint making the
partnership and the individual partners defendants. The Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky held that the amendment did not relate back to
the date of the original complaint and was, therefore, barred by the
statute of limitations. In Cabot v. Clearwater Construction Co.,17 the
action was against the "Clearwater Construction Company, a corpora-
tion." The summons was served upon Snyder, who was the sole owner
of the business which was not incorporated. After the statute of limita-
tions had run, the plaintiff amended his complaint to substitute as
defendant "Snyder, doing business as Clearwater Construction Com-
pany." The Supreme Court of Florida held that the amendment
related back to the date of the original complaint so as to avoid the
statute of limitations. In both cases, the defendant had notice of
plaintiff's claim from the outset, but in the Lingar case, a technical error
in pleading was permitted to defeat an apparently meritorious claim.
As stated by Justice Holmes:
[W]hen a defendant has bad notice from the beginning that the
plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of
specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not
exist, and ... a liberal rule should be applied.' 8
Assuming the validity of the "entity" approach, it is still apparent
that an amendment may bring in a new party rather than correct a
misnomer in the description of an entity when the amendment sub-
stitutes a corporation for individual defendants as in the Gilbert case.
A subjective test is unworkable since only the most naive pleader
would admit that he had sued the wrong party.19 Professor Moore
states:
The test should be whether, on the basis of an objective standard,
it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a par-
ticular entity or person, merely made a mistake as to the name, and
10298 Ky. 216, 182 S.W. 2d 657 (1944).
17 89 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1956).
18 New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346
(1922). See also, Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 195 (1954); Godfrey v. Eastern
Gas & Fuel Associates, 71 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Mass. 1947).10 Cf., Glint Factors, Inc. v. Schnapp, 126 F. 2d 207, 210 (2d Cir. 1942)
(concurring opinion by Judge Clark).
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actually served the entity or person intended; or whether plaintiff
actually meant to serve and sue a different person.20
Applying this test to the facts in the Gilbert case, it is probable that
the plaintiff intended to sue the individual members of the school
board rather than the board as an entity. There are no facts from
which it can be inferred that the plaintiff was under the misconception
that the board was not a corporation. Therefore, the effect of the
amendment was to bring in a new party, and the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky was correct in holding that the statute of limitations was
a bar to the amended complaint.
Although the decision in the Gilbert case appears sound, it is hoped
that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky will not follow the line of
cases represented by Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co. All of those cases
were decided prior to the adoption of Rule 15.03 of the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, the Court of Appeals should feel
free to adopt the position of the Florida Supreme Court in Cabot v.
Clearwater Construction Co. since that case involved the interpreta-
tion of a rule which is identical with Kentucky Rule 15.03.21
James Park, Jr.
ToRTs-BLAs iNG-Snucr LLxBrrr FOR CONCUSSION DAmAcE-Plain-
tiff, a landowner, brought an action against the City of Nicholasville
and Aldredge-Poage, Inc., a construction company, for damage to her
house and outbuildings resulting from blasting. The blasting was
done by the company pursuant to its contract with the city to con-
struct a water line from the Kentucky River to Nicholasville over a
right-of-way furnished by the city.1 Plaintiff alleged trespass damage
from flying rocks, concussion and vibration, and negligence on the
part of the construction company and received a judgment for $10,200
against both defendants on verdicts of $200 for the trespass damage
and $10,000 for damages resulting from negligence. Held: Judgment
against the city affirmed; judgment against the construction company
affirmed as to the trespass, reversed as to the negligence. Since plain-
20 2 Moore, Federal Practice see. 4.44, at p. 1042 (2d ed. 1948). See also,
Wagner v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926 (M.D. Pa. 1956). For an
excellent application of this test, see Sanders v. Metzger, 66 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.
Pa. 1946).
21 Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.15(c).
1 The city was joined as defendant by reason of an easement obtained from
the plaintiff in which the city covenanted to repair, or reimburse the landowner
for, damage to the property resulting from the construction, repair, replacement
or maintenance of the water line.
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